Gao major defense acquisition programs

The size and cost of the portfolio is currently the lowest in a decade. The decrease in current portfolio cost is due primarily to significant quantity decreases on two programs—most other programs actually experienced a cost increase over the past year. The average time to deliver initial capability to the warfighter also increased by over 1 month. The F, the costliest program in the portfolio, epitomizes this loss in buying power as its costs have risen over the past year without any change in quantity, meaning it is paying more for the same amount of capability.

Buying Power Analysis for the Portfolio Fiscal year dollars in billions. Change attributable to quantity changes. Change not attributable to quantity changes. Most of the 38 programs GAO assessed this year are not yet fully following a knowledge-based acquisition approach.

Such delays are due, in part, to delivery or test delays and poor system performance. Most MDAPs continue to forgo opportunities to improve cost and schedule outcomes by not adhering to leading practices for weapon system acquisitions. Some MTA programs also reported planning to acquire only limited product knowledge during program execution, leading to added risks to planned follow-on efforts. Further, while both MDAPs and MTA programs increasingly reported using modern software approaches and cybersecurity measures, they inconsistently implemented leading practices, such as frequently delivering software to users and conducting certain types of cybersecurity assessments during development.

Title 10, section b of the U. This report assesses the following aspects of DOD's costliest weapon programs: their characteristics and performance, planned or actual implementation of knowledge-based acquisition practices, and implementation of selected software and cybersecurity practices.

Further, GAO has emphasized the need to sustain the implementation of acquisition reforms and for programs to complete developmental testing before beginning production, thereby avoiding concurrency and its associated cost and schedule growth.

With the continuing budgetary pressures, DOD cannot afford to miss opportunities to address inefficiencies in these programs to free up resources for higher priority needs. This report includes observations on 1 the cost and schedule performance of DOD's portfolio of 79 major defense acquisition programs; 2 the knowledge attained at key junctures in the acquisition process for 43 programs that were in development or early production; and 3 key acquisition reform initiatives and program concurrency.

GAO also collected data through two questionnaires to program offices on technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge; the use of knowledge-based acquisition practices; and the implementation of acquisition reforms and initiatives.

In commenting on a draft of this report DOD agreed with our findings and noted that our results appear to validate DOD's focus on continuous improvements. For more information, contact Michael J.